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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Notice of Appeal filed by Appellant Val ML Ellison ("Ellison") was timely, 
and this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j) (2008). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As to Defendant Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company ("Hartford"), 
the issue before this Court is the following: 
Did the district court correctly grant summary judgment on Plaintiff Ellison's four 
claims against Hartford on the grounds that Hartford established there was no genuine 
issue of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of the 
claims, and that Ellison failed to submit admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment for Hartford? 
Ellison correctly notes that this Court is to review the district court's "legal 
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, and 
view[] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, \ 6, 177 P.3d 600. 
However, the Court is to review the district court's decisions regarding the 
admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion, despite the fact that those 
1
 In both the statement of the case and the argument section of his brief, Ellison combines 
the discussion of his claims against Hartford and Utah County Government ("Utah 
County"). Although there is some overlap between the facts pertinent to the claims 
against both Defendants, the claims are separate and distinct. Hartford will address only 
Ellison's failure to raise genuine issues of material fact as to the claims against it. 
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rulings led to the entry of summary judgment In re Rights to Use of All Water, 1999 UT 
39, ffl[ 26-27, 982 P.2d 65 (holding trial court had not "overstepped its broad discretion" 
in ruling that evidence submitted in opposition to motion for partial summary judgment 
was inadmissible); see also, e.g., Apple Park, LLC v. Apple Park Condominiums, 
LLC, 2008 MT 284, ^ 12, 345 Mont 359, 192 P.3d 232 ("We review the conclusions of 
law upon which the district court bases its decision to determine if they are correct In 
the context of a summary judgment ruling, we review the district courts admission or 
exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion") (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS ON APPEAL 
This appeal turns primarily on common-law principles. However, Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-21-104(4)-(5) (2008) also bears on the issues in this appeal. A verbatim 
copy of that statute is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Hartford objects to Ellison's Statement of the Case, (Br. of Appellant at 2-8), 
because it omits or glosses over several factors that are important to the outcome of this 
appeal and because it contains characterizations of the evidence that unfairly distort the 
record below. Hartford offers the following Statement of the Case, which more 
accurately describes the facts of the case, the record materials considered by the district 
court, and the proceedings below. 
A. Proceedings Below. 
Ellison initiated this action in the district court with a Complaint asserting claims 
against Hartford for breach of contract (claim 3), breach of the covenant of good faith and 
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fair dealing (claim 4), fraud (claim 5), and estoppel (claim 6), as well as additional claims 
against Utah County. (R. 1-12.) Following discovery, both Hartford and Utah County 
moved for summary judgment. (R. 73-76, 502-504.) Hartford supported its motion with 
extensive citations to deposition transcripts (including primarily Ellison's own 
deposition), a verbatim transcript of the telephone conversation between Ellison and a 
Hartford employee that is the basis for his claims against Hartford, the pertinent policy 
documents and related papers, Ellison's Complaint and Initial Disclosures, court 
documents, and other materials. (R. 77-413.) Ellison opposed the motion (R. 416-35), 
but he admitted virtually all of Hartford's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. (R. 
432.) He submitted no evidence of his own and confined his opposition to a discussion 
of the evidentiary materials Hartford had submitted. (R. 416-35.) 
After briefing was complete, the district court held oral argument on July 20, 2007 
and granted both motions for summary judgment from the bench. (R. 644, 660.) At the 
district court's request, (R. 644), Hartford submitted a proposed order to implement the 
decision. Ellison objected to the proposed order, arguing that it "include[d] several items 
not discussed by the Court." (R. 645-46.) Nevertheless, after editing Hartford's 
proposed order by deleting some of the language, the district court adopted the proposed 
order as its own, granting summary judgment on all claims on January 23, 2008. (R. 647-
57.) Among other holdings, the district court held Ellison had failed to satisfy his 
Copies of the Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants are attached 
hereto as Addendum B and to the Brief of Appellant as Appendix B. Ellison complains 
that the district court initially observed in a minute entry that the proposed order appeared 
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burden in opposing summary judgment because much of the evidence he proffered in 
support of essential elements of his claims was inadmissible. Id. 
This appeal followed. 
B. Statement of Facts, 
1. The Policy, 
Ellison is a resident of Utah County, Utah and is an employee of Utah County 
Government. (R. 378, 376.) As a benefit to eligible employees, Utah County offered life 
insurance coverage to employees and their "Dependents." (R. 373, 292-93, 220-33.) 
During the time period relevant to this lawsuit, Utah County's life insurance plan was 
funded by a group insurance policy issued by Hartford—policy number GLT-674591 (the 
"Policy"). (R. 373, 292-93, 220-55.) 
Ellison began working for Utah County in 1995. (R. 375.) In 1998, he elected 
dependent life insurance coverage in the amount of $200,000 for Sherrie Ellison, his 
then-wife. (R. 10 at ff 11-13.) Sherrie Ellison was at that time eligible for coverage 
under the Policy's Dependent Coverage provisions. (R. 229.) 
to be a more detailed document than the court had anticipated. (Br. of Appellant at 3.) 
Such quibbling is beside the point, since the district court adopted the proposed order 
after making revisions of its own. 
3
 Much of the factual information set forth below closely tracks the Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts in Hartford's memorandum in support of its motion for 
summary judgment below. That statement of facts is in the district court record at pages 
401-08. This is important because Ellison expressly admitted virtually all of these facts 
in his memorandum opposing Hartford's summary judgment motion. (R. 432.) The 
statement that follows cites frequently to the pages in the parties' respective memoranda 
below in which Hartford asserted facts and Ellison admitted them. For the convenience 
of the Court, the following factual recitation also includes detailed citations to those 
portions of the record containing the underlying evidentiary support for the facts. 
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Utah County conducted an annual "benefits fair" during which employees signed 
up for, changed, or received information about their various employee benefit plans— 
including life insurance. (R. 267-68, 370-72.) 
Utah County was responsible for administering many aspects of the Plan. Its 
duties included: 
a. enrolling employees upon hiring, termination, or during open enrollment 
(R. 131, 168-71); 
b. administering changes in beneficiaries (R. 131, 168-71); 
c. collecting of premiums from employees via payroll deductions (R. 214, 
168-71); 
d. determining when an employee needed to submit a Personal Health 
Statement (R. 131, 168-71); 
e. maintaining accurate records relating to enrollment (R. 131, 168-71); and 
f. submitting premium payments to Hartford. (R. 131, 168-71.) 
Hartford, on the other hand, was responsible for evaluating and paying claims for 
life insurance proceeds according to the terms of the Policy. (R. 132, 168-71.) 
It was each employee's responsibility to provide to Utah County enrollment 
information related to his dependents. (R. 129, 168-71.) The Policy defines 
"Dependent" as "Your spouse" and "Your unmarried child." (R. 494, 599.) The Policy 
states that Dependent Coverage terminates on the date when, "the Dependent no longer 
meets the definition of Dependent." (R. 546, 223, 292-93.) 
4852-5311-7954 2 5 
The Policy contains a conversion provision that permits a covered individual 
whose coverage is terminating to convert his/her life insurance coverage to a "conversion 
policy." The conversion provision states, 
How does an individual convert coverage? 
To convert life insurance, the individual must, within 31 days 
of the date group coverage terminates, make written 
application to Us and pay the premium for his age and class 
of risk. 
(R. 221, 292-93.) Thus, the ex-dependent seeking to convert his/her policy must make 
application to Hartford to convert dependent coverage into an individual policy. Hartford 
had a preprinted form (the "Conversion Paperwork") that former dependents were 
required to use to make application for conversion coverage. (R. 122-27, 163-64.) 
It is undisputed that under the terms of the Policy, Utah County bore the 
responsibility to inform employees like Ellison of the Policy's Conversion Privilege. The 
Policy's Administration Manual states, referring to Utah County, "Your responsibilities 
include: . ~ . Notifying employees of their right to exercise the Conversion Privilege." 
(R. 131, 168-71.) Utah County has admitted that it bore the responsibility to inform its 
employees of the Conversion Privilege. Peggy Poulsen, Utah County's Benefits 
Coordinator testified: 
Q Is it accurate that you understood that it was Utah 
County's obligation to notify employees of their right to 
exercise the conversion privilege? 
A Yes. 
(R. 167.) 
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2. Sherrie Ellison. 
In 2001, Sherrie Ellison was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer, a condition that 
was terminal. (R. 10 at *{ 15, 405, 432, 605.) 
During her illness, Ms. Ellison initiated divorce proceedings against Ellison. (R. 
10 at f 16, 330-31, 405, 432, 605.) On August 21, 2003, the divorce was finalized. (R. 
10 at f 16, 110-120, 327, 405, 432, 605.) The court entered a detailed, eleven-page 
Decree of Divorce. (R. 110-120,327.) 
Sherrie Ellison died shortly thereafter on October 19, 2003. (R. 9 at ^23 , 405, 
432.) 
3. Ellison's Alleged Interactions With Utah County Personnel, 
Ellison alleged that, at approximately the beginning of 2002, he contacted 
someone in Utah County's personnel department, whom he could not identify, regarding 
continuing life insurance coverage on his wife after their divorce. (R. 364-65, 405, 432.) 
Ellison claimed that thej)ersonnel department told him that to continue the coverage he 
would need to continue to make the premium payments, but to contact Hartford to 
confirm. (R. 364, 405, 432.) 
Ellison alleged that the unidentified Utah County employee did not inform him 
that his ex-wife had to complete additional paperwork to convert the dependent life 
insurance coverage into an individual policy. (R. 364, 405, 432.) Ellison further alleged 
that at no time did anyone at Utah County inform him of his ex-wife's conversion right or 
the procedures necessary for her to convert the policy. (R. 363-64, 405, 432.) 
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Ellison also alleged that he queried Utah County regarding continuing his ex-wife 
under the dependent terms of his employee health insurance plan. He alleged he was told 
that if he tried to leave her on his health insurance following their divorce, he would be 
committing insurance fraud, (R. 355, 405, 432,) 
4 Ellison's One Alleged Telephone Call to Hartford, 
All of Ellison's claims against Hartford are based exclusively on his allegation that 
he made a single call to Hartford to follow up on his alleged conversation with the 
unknown Utah County employee, during which he claimed to have spoken with two 
Hartford employees concerning whether life insurance coverage for Sherrie Ellison could 
continue following the couple's divorce. (R. 337.) Because Ellison's plea that his case 
should proceed to a jury rests exclusively on this single telephone call, Hartford will 
describe the actual evidence before the district court on this point in considerable detail. 
On January 30, 2002, Ellison called Hartford's Medical Underwriting customer 
service area. (R. 333-37, 404, 432; Add, C.) At his deposition over four years later, on 
May 19, 2006, Ellison recalled that he placed only this single phone call, as confirmed by 
Utah County phone records from his work extension at Utah County, during which he 
claims he spoke with two people. (R. 327-28, 333-36, 404, 432; Add. C.) He testified 
that the conversation with the first person was "probably pretty short. I asked her the 
4
 Ellison conceded in his deposition that he had no other communications with Hartford 
prior to his wife's death, after which he contacted Hartford about initiating the claims 
process. (R. 337, 332-33, 403, 432,) 
5
 Ellison's entire testimony concerning the substance of this call is set forth in only five 
pages of his deposition transcript, pages 45-49. (R. 333-37.) For the convenience of the 
Court, copies of those five transcript pages are attached hereto as Addendum C, 
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question about can you continue life insurance^ and she indicated that she thought that I 
could as long as I pay the premiums. But then she said she wanted to transfer me to 
someone else just to make sure" (R. 336, 404, 432; Add. C (emphasis added).) He 
further testified that the second person "confirmed what the first person said .... That you 
can continue the life insurance on my spouse if I divorce her, as long as you keep paying 
the premiums." (R. 334, 404, 432; Add. C (emphasis added).)6 
Although Ellison could not recall at his deposition in May, 2006 the name(s) of 
the person(s) at Hartford with whom he spoke (R. 334, 336-37; Add. C), Hartford located 
a recording of the January 30, 2002 call. Hartford prepared and submitted to the district 
6
 Ellison's brief erroneously asserts that Ellison testified the Hartford employees 
expressly told him the only thing he needed to do to continue life insurance on his ex-
wife was to continue paying the premiums, and affirmatively stated he did not need to do 
anything else. See, e.g., Br. of Appellant at 7 ("This Hartford employee also told Mr. 
Ellison that the only thing he needed to do to continue coverage under the Policy after his 
divorce was to continue paying the required premiums.") (emphasis in original), 11 
(stating Hartford had "informed Mr. Ellison that his anticipated divorce would in no way 
affect coverage if he simply continued to pay the premiums"), 15 (stating that 
"[according to Mr. Ellison's sworn testimony, this Hartford employee again confirmed 
that the Policy would not be affected by divorce so long as the premiums were paid"). 
These characterizations overstate and materially distort Ellison's actual testimony 
concerning the call, as well as the verbatim transcript of the conversation with the first of 
the two Hartford employees with whom he allegedly spoke. The actual evidence shows 
that Ellison did not attest to the categorical assurances he argues in his brief. Hartford 
urges the Court to inspect carefully the five deposition pages containing Ellison's actual 
testimony concerning the telephone call (R. 333-337; Add. C), as well as the two-page 
verbatim transcript of the first part of the call (R. 101-02; Add. D), rather than accepting 
the self-serving characterizations of that evidence contained in Ellison's brief. These 
materials are attached as Addenda C and D, respectively. 
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court a transcript of that call, which Ellison conceded below (and concedes fiirther on 
appeal) is authentic. (R. 101-02, 404, 432, 573-74; Br. of Appellant at 14 and App. C.)7 
As the transcript indicates, during the call, Ellison spoke with Linda Daly of 
Hartford's Medical Underwriting area. (R. 101-02, 404, 432; Add. D.) Ellison stated to 
Ms. Daly that Utah County informed him he could continue insurance on his spouse, 
even if he and his wife divorced. He asked Ms. Daly if this was accurate. Ms. Daly 
responded that she "believed" he could, but she did not affirmatively confirm that he 
could or even state that she knew the answer to the question. (R. 101-02; Add. D.) 
Ellison next told Ms. Daly that he needed a letter for the court stating the coverage 
could continue. Id. Ms. Daly asked if Ellison had filled out a personal health statement, 
and he said he had. Ms. Daly then essentially told Ellison the question tie had asked was 
outside her area of expertise, responding that she was in the medical underwriting area 
and that in her area they simply "underwrite the application" and "don Jt administer the 
plan" Id. (emphasis added). 
Ellison responded that his HR department had told him to call Hartford and said 
again that he needed something in writing. At that point, Ms. Daly responded that she 
was going to transfer Ellison to another number, to someone who hopefully would be 
better able to help him, and advised Ellison to call her back if the other person could not 
help him. Mr. Ellison asked for Ms. Daly's name to write down. She spelled her name 
for him and gave him another number to call. Id. 
A copy of that transcript, which is also Appendix C to the Brief of Appellant, is 
attached hereto as Addendum D. 
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Ellison admitted he did not ask Ms. Daly or anyone else at Hartford what needed 
to be done, e.g. completion paperwork or otherwise, in order to effect the continuation of 
coverage on his ex-wife. (R. 101-02, 334, 403, 432; Add. D.) 
Although the transcript suggests that the call then terminated (R. 101-02; Add. D), 
Ellison testified at his deposition that Ms. Daly transferred him to a second Hartford 
employee and that he had a conversation with her as well. (R. 334-35; Add. C.) 
However, Ellison offered no deposition testimony (and has not argued below or in his 
brief on appeal) that the second Hartford employee said anything materially different to 
him than Ms. Daly did during their conversation. To the contrary, when asked during his 
deposition what happened in this second conversation, Ellison testified, uShe confirmed 
what the first person said." (R. 334; Add. C.) Thus, according to Ellison's own 
testimony, the verbatim transcript of his conversation with Ms. Daly (R. 101-02; Add. D) 
fairly reflects the sum and substance of his alleged conversation with the second 
employee as well. 
The evidence before the district court concerning Ellison's single telephone call to 
Hartford was detailed and undisputed. The evidence was also undisputed that neither 
Ellison nor his wife did anything over the next one year and seven months leading up to 
the divorce to effect a continuation of her coverage. 
5. Ellison's Claim for Life Insurance Proceeds, 
Ellison never asked for or obtained a copy of the Policy until after his ex-wife's 
death. (R. 297-98, 403, 432.) 
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After Ms. Ellison died, Ellison made a claim to Hartford for life insurance 
proceeds. (R. 9 at fflf 23-24, 402, 432.) Hartford denied Ellison's claim on the ground 
that his wife did not fit the policy's definition of "Dependent." (R. 9 at ^ 25, 402, 432.) 
Ellison appealed this decision, claiming he had talked to representatives of 
Hartford who told him that "life insurance can be continued even after a divorce." (R. 
98-99, 301-02, 402, 432 (emphasis added).) 
Ellison's appeal was assigned to Edna Golych, one of Hartford's appeals 
specialists. Ms. Golych investigated Ellison's claims regarding the representations that 
both Utah County and Hartford allegedly made. Specifically, Ms. Golych contacted Utah 
County to ascertain whether the County told Ellison he could continue his ex-wife's life 
insurance after their divorce. Utah County told Ms. Golych it was unaware of any such 
representation. (R. 77-83, 402, 432.) 
Ms. Golych also contacted Hartford's group benefits call center to inquire whether 
it had any record of the call referenced in Ellison's appeal. The only call the center could 
verify was Ellison's October 23, 2003 call requesting a proof of death form. The center 
Q 
had no record of the call referenced in Ellison's appeal letter. (R. 77-83, 402, 432.) 
Given the Policy's terms, which unambiguously state that dependent coverage 
terminates when a dependent no longer meets the definition of dependent, Hartford 
denied Ellison's appeal (R. 8-9 at \ 26, 401, 432.) 
Hartford later located the Ellison/Daly call after it learned Ellison had called its medical 
underwriting department rather than the group benefits call center. (R. 402, 432.) 
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6. Ellison's Lack of Evidence of Damages. 
The Ellisons' divorce decree did not address life insurance for Sherrie Ellison, 
despite her terminal illness. The court entered a detailed eleven-page Decree of Divorce 
that comprehensively addressed and resolved the financial issues between Ellison and his 
ex-wife (R. 110-20), including such matters as child support (R. 115 at f 5), alimony (R. 
115 at f 6), disposition of the marital home (R. 115 f 7), health and dental insurance for 
the couple's children (R. 115 *f 8), health insurance under COBRA for Ms. Ellison (R. 
115 f 8.A.), the disposition of the debts and obligations of the parties (R. 112-14), the 
disposition of retirement benefits (R. 112 at f 13), attorneys fees (R. 112 f^ 14), tax 
returns (R. 111-12 at % 16), and the purchase of clothing for the children (R. I l l at |^ 18). 
The Decree of Divorce contained a provision specifically requiring Ellison to maintain 
insurance on his life for the benefit of his minor children: 
It is reasonable and proper that [sic] for the Respondent 
[Ellison] to maintain a life insurance policy on his life as 
available through his place of employment at reasonable cost 
during the children's minority with as much coverage as 
possible, with the children listed as the sole beneficiaries and 
Wells Fargo Bank designated as the trustee. The trust shall 
provide with an emphasis on assisting the minor children 
during their minority years. 
(R. 111 at Tf 18.) The Decree of Divorce made no mention of life insurance coverage for 
Sherrie Ellison. (R. 110-20.) It contained no requirement for her to convert her 
dependent life insurance coverage through Ellison's employer to an individual policy, 
much less any requirement that she name her ex-husband (as opposed to her minor 
children, as with Ellison's policy) as the beneficiary. Id 
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Further, Ellison could proffer no admissible evidence to the district court that Ms. 
Ellison would have agreed to submit the paperwork necessary to convert her dependent 
life insurance coverage prior to her death, naming the ex-husband she had recently 
divorced as her beneficiary. Ellison testified, 
Q You were asked just prior to our taking a break 
whether or not you believe, or whether or not you have any 
evidence that Sherrie would have agreed to this conversion 
policy or the conversion. And you said, you don't have any 
written evidence, but you intimated that you might have other 
evidence. 
A No, what I—what I think what I said was that Fm 
quite sure that she would have, just knowing her. But I don't 
have anything written. 
Q Do you have any evidence other than your belief. 
A No. 
(R. 287-88, 401, 432.) The district court accordingly held there was no admissible 
evidence to establish that Sherrie Ellison would have converted the dependent life 
insurance coverage to an individual policy or would have named Ellison as the 
beneficiary had she done so. (R. 649.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly granted summary judgment on Ellison's claims against 
Hartford because Hartford demonstrated that there were no genuinely disputed issues of 
Ellison did state in his deposition that he had a conversation with Sherrie "when she 
first got ill" about the Policy and discussed using the proceeds "to help the kids with 
missions and schooling and so forth" (R. 287, 323), but that testimony was inadmissible 
hearsay, as explained below, and concerned an alleged conversation with Sherrie that 
occurred at least a year and half before the Decree of Divorce was negotiated and the 
divorce was finalized. (R. 10 atffif 15-16, 110-120, 327, 405, 432, 605.) 
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material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ellison completely 
failed to meet his burden to show genuine disputes of material fact sufficient to allow his 
case to proceed to trial. 
First, Ellison failed to submit admissible evidence of damages, an essential 
element of all four of his claims. Specifically, Ellison failed to proffer admissible 
evidence showing that Sherrie Ellison, after divorcing Ellison while terminally ill with 
pancreatic cancer, would have converted her group coverage to an individual policy, 
named Ellison as the beneficiary, and paid premiums on that policy. Ellison's deposition 
testimony, which was the only evidence he submitted on this subject, was inadmissible 
speculation and hearsay. The district court acted within its discretion in disregarding 
Ellison's inadmissible testimony, and in the absence of any admissible evidence of 
damages, summary judgment was proper on all of Ellison's claims against Hartford. This 
Court can affirm the district court on this ground alone. 
- Second, summary judgment was proper on Ellison's fraud claim against Hartford 
because Ellison could not demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact concerning 
several essential elements of his fraud claim. Most importantly, Ellison failed to show 
that Hartford made any false representation of material fact to Ellison. The undisputed 
facts show that the alleged statements of Hartford's employees, which were explicitly 
qualified with uncertainty, were true. Ellison also failed to submit evidence showing that 
the Hartford employees he spoke to "knew" or "recklessly disregarded" the alleged 
falsity of their statements. Finally, there was no evidence before the district court to 
establish that Hartford's employees induced Ellison to rely on their alleged 
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representations, or that Ellison's alleged reliance on those representations was reasonable 
in light of his failure to check the Policy document itself. These were all essential 
elements of Ellison's fraud claim, and his failure to show a genuine factual dispute on 
any one of them, let alone all of them, required summary judgment on the fraud claim. 
Third, the district court properly entered summary judgment on Ellison's estoppel 
claims because it failed as a matter of law. Under the authority of this Court's decision in 
Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Co,, 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) and other 
similar case law, "the doctrine of estoppel. . . cannot be used to bring risks which were 
not covered by the terms of the policy within coverage of the policy" Id, at 1131. 
Because Ellison's estoppel claim improper sought to use estoppel to expand the scope of 
coverage under an existing policy (i.e., to expand the scope of group coverage on 
employees' dependents to include non-dependents as well), the district court properly 
held that the claim failed as a matter of law. Summary judgment was also correct 
because the alleged statements upon which the claim is based were insufficiently definite 
as a matter of law, and the Hartford employees who allegedly made the statements did 
not have authority to bind Hartford according to the undisputed facts. 
Fourth, summary judgment was proper on Ellison's breach of contract claim 
against Hartford because the unambiguous terms of the Policy provided that life 
insurance coverage on Sherrie Ellison terminated when the Ellisons' divorce became 
final, at which point Sherrie Ellison ceased to be a "dependent" within the meaning of the 
Policy. On appeal, Ellison fails to explain why he believes his breach of contract claim 
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against Hartford has merit, and he appears essentially to have abandoned that claim on 
appeal. 
Finally, summary judgment was proper on Ellison's claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the undisputed facts 
demonstrated that Ellison's lack of entitlement to life insurance proceeds for his ex-wife 
was at very least "fairly debatable" as a matter of law. Also, the undisputed facts show 
that Hartford investigated Ellison's claim carefully, both originally and on appeal after 
Hartford initially denied it, and at all time dealt with him in good faith. 
ARGUMENT 
h STANDARD OF ANALYSIS. 
Ellison fails to address the key question on appeal: whether he proffered 
admissible evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to require 
reversal of summary judgment for Hartford. Although Ellison complains that some of the 
facts before the district court were disputed, and lists several examples in which he 
claims the evidence conflicted or gave rise to competing inferences, he fails to tie them to 
the essential elements of his claims against Hartford. Br. of Appellant at 9-35. Rule 56 
"does not preclude summary judgment simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, 
but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted" Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. 
Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). Ellison's unfocused 
discussion of allegedly competing evidence and inferences fails to establish that a factual 
dispute was "genuine" or that it was "material." 
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Although all inferences that reasonably can be drawn from the facts should be 
drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment or urging its reversal on appeal, 
Ho v. Jim's Enter., Inc., 2001 UT 63, ^ 2, 29 P.3d 633; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
All U.S. 242, 255 (1986), that party has the duty to "set forth specific facts showing there 
is a genuine issue for trial." DLB Collection Trust by Helgesen & Waterfall v. Harris, 
893 P.2d 593, 597 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e)). "[BJare 
contentions unsupported by any specification of facts in support thereof, raise no material 
questions of fact as will preclude entry of summary judgment." Massey v. Utah Power & 
Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980). Moreover, a party seeking reversal of summary 
judgment must show that he properly opposed summary judgment before the district 
court with admissible evidence. Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., Inc., 2004 UT App 
354, |^ 20, 101 P.3d 371.10 An alleged factual dispute based on bare contentions, 
speculation, or inadmissible evidence is not a "genuine" factual dispute. 
Ellison also has made no serious attempt to show that the alleged factual issues 
were "material." "The mere existence of genuine issues of fact . . . does not preclude the 
entry of summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to resolution of the case." 
Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982). None of the alleged 
factual disputes described in Ellison's brief was "material" unless he proffered sufficient 
As noted above, although this Court is to review the district court's ultimate grant of 
summary judgment de novo, the district court's evidentiary rulings in connection with its 
grant of summary judgment are not to be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. 
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evidence below to make a prima facie showing on all the essential elements of his claims 
that Hartford had challenged through its summary judgment motion: 
[Sjummary judgment should be entered against a party who 
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 
an element essential to that party's case, . . . because the 
complete failure of proof on an essential element of the 
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts 
immaterial 
Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1392-93 (Utah App. 1994) (emphasis added) (citing 
Celotex Corp. V. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).11 It is not enough for Ellison 
merely to point to a bit of conflicting evidence in one place or argue for a competing 
inference in another place, as he does throughout his brief. Such alleged disputes are 
"immaterial" unless he clears all hurdles and shows this Court that he properly supported 
all essential elements of his claims below. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER ON ALL CLAIMS AGAINST 
HARTFORD BECAUSE ELLISON FURNISHED NO ADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE TO THE DISTRICT COURT, WHICH WAS AN 
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF ALL FOUR CLAIMS AGAINST HARTFORD. 
As a threshold matter, the Court can and should affirm summary judgment on all 
of Ellison's claims against Hartford because Ellison failed to submit any admissible 
evidence of damages to the district court. Damages are an essential element of all four of 
Ellison's claims against Hartford. See Prince v. Bear River Mut Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, 
f 41, 56 P.3d 524 (listing damage as an element of fraud); Perkins v. Great-West Life 
11
 See also Sanns v. Butter field Ford, 2004 UT App 203, \ 9, 94 P.3d 301 (same); Burns 
v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 420 (Utah App. 1994) (same); Wilson v. Valley 
Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416, 417 (Utah 1998) (affirming summary judgment where 
plaintiffs "could not prove an essential element of their negligence claim" (emphasis 
added)). 
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Assur, Co., 814 P.2d 1125, 1129-30 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (must establish "detriment or 
damage" to recover on estoppel theory); Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, ^ f 14, 
20 P.3d 388 (must prove damages to recover for breach of contract); Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801-02 (Utah 1985) (discussing damages as element of claim 
for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing). Ellison's failure to submit any 
admissible evidence of damages was fatal to all of his claims against Hartford, and the 
Court may affirm summary judgment for this reason alone. Under the authority set forth 
above, even if there were a genuine factual dispute concerning another element of 
Ellison's claims, which there is not, his failure to prove damages renders such a dispute 
immaterial. The Court need not proceed further in its analysis. 
To make the necessary showing that he suffered damage, Ellison was required to 
submit admissible evidence showing that Sherrie Ellison, who was terminally ill with 
pancreatic cancer at the time she divorced him, would have converted her dependent 
coverage into an individual policy, would have paid the premiums on that policy, and 
would have named her ex-husband as the policy's beneficiary. There was absolutely 
12
 The fact that Sherrie Ellison, rather than her ex-husband, was the party required to 
execute the conversion paperwork to permit insurance to be taken out on her life was not 
merely a peculiarity of the Policy or a "loose end." There are obvious and important 
policy reasons why individuals should not be permitted in ordinary circumstances to take 
out insurance policies on the lives of other people, without the insureds' consent, and 
name themselves as beneficiaries. Indeed, Utah's insurance code provides that in most 
circumstances, 
an insurer may not knowingly issue an individual life or accident and health 
insurance policy to a person other than the one whose life or health is at 
risk unless that person . . . gives written consent to the issuance of the 
policy. 
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no admissible evidence to that effect presented to the district court, and the district court 
cited this ground as one of many independent reasons summary judgment was proper: 
[T]here is no connection between Mr. Ellison's alleged loss 
and his claimed damages in this case. There is no admissible 
evidence from which the fact-finder can reasonably infer that 
Sherrie Ellison would have converted her group insurance 
policy into an individual policy, and there is no evidence that 
Mr. Ellison, rather than Sherrie Ellison's estate or heirs, 
would have been the beneficiaries of that conversion policy. 
(R. 649.) 
Rather than offer admissible evidence to show that Sherrie Ellison would have 
completed the Conversion Paperwork for an individual policy and named him as the 
beneficiary, Ellison relied upon nothing but inadmissible speculation and hearsay to 
support the damages element of his claims. He speculated in his deposition that, 
"knowing his wife," she would have converted the dependent policy into an individual 
policy. (R. 287-88.) Such speculation is inadmissible under Rule 602 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, which precludes a witness from testifying on a matter "unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-104(4)(a) (2008). Prior to the Ellisons' divorce, this 
prohibition would not have applied because the statute contains certain exceptions to the 
consent requirement, including that "[a] person may obtain life and accident and health 
insurance on an immediate family member who is living with or dependent on the 
person." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21 -104(5)(a)(iii) (2008). After the divorce, however, 
when Sherrie Ellison was no longer a dependent of Ellison's, the strong policy rationale 
for preventing one from imposing life insurance coverage on an unconsenting insured 
became applicable, and Utah law would have prohibited the insurance. Thus, the 
Policy's requirement that Sherrie Ellison herself needed to complete the Conversion 
Paperwork was not merely red tape. It was a critical feature of the Policy designed to 
ensure that a conversion policy taken out by an employee's former spouse following a 
divorce would not violate applicable Utah law. 
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matter," This rule is designed to assure that witnesses testify as to facts "based on 
personal knowledge, rather than opinions inferred from such facts." Kenneth S. Broun, 
McCormick on Evidence § 10 (6th Ed. 2006). By Ellison's own admission, he has no 
personal knowledge of Sherrie Ellison's intention to convert the policy. (R. 287-88.) 
Instead, his opinion that she would have converted is classic speculation. See Utah R. 
Evid. 602; Triesault v. Greater Salt Lake Business Dist., 2005 UT App 489, f^ 14, 126 
P.3d 781 (holding it is proper to affirm summary judgment where jury "would have had 
to engage in rank speculation" to reach verdict for plaintiff); Poteet v. White, 2006 UT 
63, f 7, 147 P.3d 439 (holding that "in order to raise a dispute of fact," the non-movant 
must present the court with "admissible evidence in the record"). The district court 
validly exercised its discretion in disregarding Ellison's speculative testimony. 
Ellison also claimed that when Sherrie Ellison first became ill (le, before she filed 
for divorce and at least a year and half before they negotiated the terms of the Divorce 
Decree and their divorce became final), they had conversations wherein they discussed 
the insurance and Sherrie she told him "to use the insurance to help the kids with 
This is not an issue of "credibility," as Ellison contends in his Brief. (Br. of Appellant 
at 31.) It is an issue of admissibility. Ellison's testimony was inadmissible because it 
was impermissibly speculative on its face. The district court did not exclude the 
testimony because it did not believe what Ellison said (a "credibility" rationale); rather, it 
excluded the testimony because what Ellison said was speculative. Ellison similarly 
complains at pages 12-13 of his brief that the district court erred in holding there was no 
"credible" evidence to support numerous elements of his claims because "credibility" is 
an issue for the trier of fact. A review of the district court's order makes clear the court 
was merely holding that no admissible evidence had been admitted for the court to credit, 
not that the court disbelieved witnesses. Observing the absence of "credible evidence" is 
common, well-understood, and acceptable terminology to indicate the lack of admissible 
evidence. Ellison plainly misinterprets the district court's ruling. 
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missions and schooling and so forth." (R. 287, 323.) Ellison argues that this testimony 
about what the deceased former Mrs. Ellison allegedly said was sufficient evidence to 
create a fact question as to whether his ex-wife would have converted her dependent 
coverage, paid the premiums, and named him as the beneficiary when the parties 
divorced a year and half later. (Br. of Appellant at 30-31.) 
Ellison's testimony is classic inadmissible hearsay, and the district court validly 
exercised its discretion in disregarding it. See, e.g., Poteet, 2006 UT 63, % 10, (holding 
that "summary judgment may . . . not be denied based solely on inadmissible hearsay"); 
Gary Porter Constr., 2004 UT App 354, ^20 ("This testimony is inadmissible 
hearsay, . . . and therefore it cannot create a disputed issue of material fact."). Ellison 
seeks to have his deceased, ex-wife's supposed out of court statements admitted to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted. See Utah R. Evid. 801(c). Rule 804, which sets forth all 
of the hearsay exceptions relating to unavailable declarants, including deceased 
declarants, contains no applicable exceptions. Utah R. Evid. 804. The district court 
acted within its discretion in disregarding this inadmissible hearsay. 
Ellison urges the Court essentially to reverse the district court's exclusion of Ellison's 
hearsay testimony concerning Sherrie Ellison's alleged statements by arguing that the 
"statement against interest" and/or "statement under belief of impending death" 
exceptions to the hearsay rule should have applied. (Br. of Appellant at 31 (citing Utah 
R. Evid. 804(b)(2) and (3).) But Ellison failed to establish the applicability of either of 
these exceptions below, so this Court should not disturb the district court's discretionary 
decision to disregard Ellison's hearsay testimony. In any event, the "statement against 
interest" exception simply does not apply to Sherrie Ellison's alleged out-of-court 
statements, Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3), and Ellison does not explain why he thinks it does. 
Second, the "statement under belief of impending death" exception does not apply 
because as a threshold matter, it can apply only if the district court makes a finding that 
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The Ellisons' divorce decree also undermines Ellison's assertion that his ex-wife 
intended to convert her coverage, name Ellison as the beneficiary, and pay the premiums 
on her conversion policy. Ellison claims his conversation with Sherrie Ellison about the 
insurance occurred "[w]hen she first got ill." (R. 287.) It was only after that, during the 
period of her illness, that Sherrie Ellison filed for divorce. (R. 405, 432.) The Divorce 
Decree was not agreed to and entered by the court until more than a year and half after 
Sherrie Ellison/Tirst got ill." (R. 10 at ffi[ 15-16, 110-120, 327, 405, 432, 605.) The 
decree comprehensively addressed and resolved all financial issues between Ellison and 
his ex-wife. (R. 110-20.) It required Ellison to maintain insurance on his life for the 
benefit of his minor children (R. I l l at f^ 18), but it did not require Sherrie Ellison to 
convert her dependent life insurance policy through Ellison's employer, let alone any 
requirement to name her ex-husband (as opposed to her estate, heirs, or minor children), 
as the beneficiary. (R. 110-20.) Even if Sherrie Ellison did discuss life insurance 
proceeds with her then-husband when she initially became ill, those statements (in 
the declarant made the statement "in good faith," believing her death was "imminent." 
Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(2). The district court made neither finding, and Ellison did not ask 
it to do so. Rather, the district court held that the evidence Ellison submitted in an effort 
to demonstrate Sherrie Ellison's intentions was inadmissible. (R. 649.) Moreover, even 
if Ellison had attempted to lay proper foundation for the "dying declaration" exception to 
the hearsay rule, it would not apply to his testimony about Sherrie Ellison's alleged 
statements. The requirement of a belief that death is "imminent" means "that the 
declarant must have made the declaration while believing death would occur almost 
immediately, and not just as the ultimate result of an illness" Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 
108 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1117 (D. Mont. 1999) (holding that declarent's belief he would die 
several months later from incurable cancer did not constitute belief in "imminent" death 
under federal version of "dying declaration" exception) (emphasis added). Nothing in the 
record below suggests that Ellison's hearsay testimony concerning Sherrie Ellison's 
alleged statements about life insurance proceeds satisfied the requirements of Utah R. 
Evid. 804(b)(2). 
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addition to being inadmissible hearsay) were plainly superseded by her subsequent 
decision to file for divorce and the parties' comprehensive agreement as to all financial 
issues between them that is reflected in the Decree of Divorce. 
The district court acted within its discretion in disregarding Ellison's hearsay 
testimony and speculation concerning Sherrie Ellison's intentions. In the absence of any 
admissible evidence proving her intentions, the court was correct to grant summary 
judgment because Ellison failed to establish the essential element of damages. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON ELLISON'S FRAUD CLAIM BECAUSE THE 
UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOWED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT HE 
COULD NOT ESTABLISH NUMEROUS ELEMENTS OF THAT CLAIM. 
Plaintiffs fraud claim against Hartford is premised upon his allegation that 
Hartford told him his ex-wife's life insurance coverage "could" continue after their 
divorce as long as he continued to pay the premiums. The undisputed material facts, 
however, fail to amount to a claim for fraud as a matter of law, and the district court 
correctly granted summary judgment on that claim. 
To overcome summary judgment on his fraud claim, Ellison was required to 
submit admissible clear and convincing evidence15 in opposition to Hartford's motion 
supporting all of the following essential elements: 
(1) That a representation was made; (2) concerning a 
presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) 
which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon 
which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, 
15
 See Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah Ct App. 1994). 
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acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in 
fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his 
injury and damage. 
Prince, 2002 UT 68, f 41 (quoting Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
2001 UT 25, ^}33, 21 P.3d 198). It is proper for a court to consider the heightened 
burden of proof applicable to fraud claims in deciding whether the evidence submitted in 
opposition to a summary judgment motion is sufficient to defeat the motion. Andalex 
Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046-47 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("[A] party must 
prove a claim with clear and convincing evidence at the summary judgment stage if that 
is the burden required at trial.") (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 
254(1986)). 
The district court properly entered summary judgment on Ellison's fraud claim 
because he failed to submit admissible evidence supporting elements (2), (3), (4), (5) (6) 
or (9). Ellison's failure to furnish admissible evidence of damages is discussed above. 
His failure to submit admissible evidence on several other essential elements of his fraud 
claim, discussed below, provides other grounds upon which the district court's grant of 
summary judgment was proper, each of which is a separate and independent basis upon 
which the Court should affirm summary judgment on the fraud claim. 
A. The Undisputed Facts Show Hartford Made No False Representation 
Concerning a Presently Existing Material Fact to Ellison. 
Ellison failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to his fraud claim because 
all he proffered, at best, was that Ms. Daly told him she thought it was possible to 
continue dependent life insurance coverage on his spouse after they divorced. (R. 101-
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02, 333-337; Add. C; Add D.) Ellison repeatedly and consistently claimed, when making 
his claim for benefits, in the allegations of his Complaint, and at his deposition, that 
Hartford told him that he "could" continue life insurance coverage on his ex-wife (as 
opposed to affirmatively "did" or "had" continued), although he would need to pay the 
premiums. The recording of the critical phone call at issue (R. 101; Add. D) speaks for 
itself Ellison therefore failed to create a genuine factual dispute as to the essential 
element of whether Hartford made a false representation concerning a presently existing 
material fact. This failure alone is sufficient to affirm summary judgment on the fraud 
claim. 
It is undisputed that when Ellison called Hartford and talked to Linda Daly, he 
merely asked her to confirm what Utah County allegedly told him—that it was "possible" 
to, or that "you can" continue life insurance coverage on a ex-spouse after a divorce. (R. 
101-02, 333-337; Add. C; Add. D (emphasis added).) That is all he asked.16 Ms. Daly 
merely responded that she "thought" the coverage "could" continue. She simply did not 
state that the coverage "did" or "would" continue. All of these statements were TRUE. 
Ms. Daly made no false representations, as required for a fraud claim, and there is no 
evidence that anyone at Hartford ever told Ellison anything to the contrary. 
16
 Ellison told Ms. Daly that the reason he was inquiring was so that he could inform the 
court of that option; he never told her that he wanted to continue the coverage. (R. 101-
102; Add. D.) In his appeal letter to Hartford after the initial denial of his claim, which 
he wrote prior to this litigation, Ellison stated that Hartford told him that Sherrie Ellison's 
life insurance coverage "can be continued" after the divorce. (R. 98-99, 302-02, 402, 
432 (emphasis added).) Again in his deposition, Ellison testified that he asked Hartford 
whether his ex-wife's life insurance "could" continue after their divorce. (R. 336, 404, 
432; Add. C). 
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A statement that life insurance "could" continue, as a theoretical matter, is 
significantly different than an affirmative representation that coverage would continue. It 
is undisputed that Sherrie Ellison "could have" continued insurance coverage had she 
followed the procedures outlined in the Policy and paid her premiums. Ellison, however, 
admitted to the district court that he did not inquire regarding the procedures required to 
continue coverage. He did not inquire whether he had to submit any additional 
paperwork in order to continue the coverage. (R. 101-02, 403, 432; Add. D.) He further 
admitted that he never requested nor read the Policy until after Sherrie Ellison died. (R. 
297-98, 403, 432.) The undisputed material fact that Ellison did not ask Hartford, and 
was not told, whether his ex-wife's life insurance coverage would continue after she 
divorced him is fatal to his fraud claim.l7 
In addition, Ms. Daly's statement can hardly be considered representations of any 
sort in light of the explicit caveats she gave multiple times during the conversation, 
explaining that his question was not within her expertise, declining to agree to prepare the 
letter he requested confirming that coverage could continue, and finally referring him to 
another department. (R. 101-02; Add. D.) There is no evidence, and no room for 
reasonable inference, that Hartford made false statements. Thus, Ellison's fraud claim 
fails as a matter of law, and the district court properly granted summary judgment. 
It is also fatal to his estoppel claim, discussed below. 
1 O 
Although the recording of the telephone call does not include Ellison's alleged 
conversation with the other employee, his only description of the second conversation 
was that the second employee "confirmed what the first person said." (R. 334; Add. C.) 
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B. The Undisputed Facts Fail To Establish That the Individuals Ellison 
Spoke to at Hartford Knew or Recklessly Disregarded the Alleged 
Falsity of their Representations, 
To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact concerning his fraud claim, 
Ellison was required to submit evidence that Hartford made representations that it either 
(a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly. Ellison failed do so for two reasons: first, as 
explained above, Ms. Daly's "statement," or more accurately belief, that coverage could 
continue was in fact true. Under the explicit terms of the Policy, a former dependent can 
continue coverage under the conversion privilege. Thus, it is undisputed that Ms. Daly 
did not say anything she knew to be false. 
Second, it is undisputed that Ms. Daly explicitly qualified her belief with 
uncertainty. The transcript of Ellison's call to Ms. Daly demonstrates that although she 
"believed" he could continue his ex-wife's dependent life coverage, she clearly informed 
Ellison that such questions were beyond her knowledge and expertise. She said, "we're 
in the medical underwriting area what we do is we simply underwrite the application, we 
don't administer the plan" (R. 101-02; Add. D (emphasis added).) Finally, she 
declined to provide the letter he requested, instead referring him to another area. Id, 
Given the qualifiers Ms. Daly used in her conversation with Ellison, no reasonable jury 
could find that Hartford employees knowingly made false or reckless statements. Ellison 
clearly was on notice that Ms. Daly's statements were merely her "beliefs" and were 
outside the scope of her expertise. 
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C. Hartford's Employees Did Not Induce Ellison To Rely on Any 
Mispresentations. 
To overcome summary judgment on his fraud claim, Ellison was required to 
flimish evidence sufficient to make a prima facie showing that Hartford made 
misrepresentations to him for the purpose of inducing him to act upon the 
misrepresentations. Ellison cannot prove this element of his claim as a matter of law for 
the reasons stated above. In addition, Ellison failed to prove this element because Ellison 
indicated in his call with Ms. Daly that he was merely seeking information regarding the 
availability of continued coverage for the court in his divorce action, not the actual 
existence of such coverage. During his conversation with Ms. Daly, Ellison stated, 
"[W]hat I need then is a letter stating so for the court, saying that it is possible and then I 
will tell them that I will continue." (R. 101-02; Add. D.) Ms. Daly declined to give such 
a letter, instead referring Ellison to another area. Id. In light of the unequivocal and 
qualified nature of Ms. Daly's statements, there was no evidence establishing, or 
permitting a reasonable inference, that Ms. Daly made the statements for the purpose of 
inducing Ellison to act upon them. 
D. Ellison's Alleged Reliance on the Statements of Hartford's Employees 
Was Unreasonable as a Matter of Law. 
Ellison's fraud claim also failed because the material undisputed facts showed that 
Ellison's alleged reliance upon the purported representations of Hartford's employees 
was reasonable. Utah courts, as well as courts in other jurisdictions, have held that a 
plaintiffs reliance on an alleged misrepresentation is unreasonable as a matter of law 
when the misrepresentation is contradicted by a writing that governs the parties' 
4852-5311-7954 2 30 
relationship. For example, in Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 1125 
(Utah App. 1991), this Court held that the plaintiffs reliance upon misrepresentations 
regarding her insurance coverage was unreasonable as a matter of law given the 
unambiguous terms of her insurance policy. In so holding, the Court stated that a party 
cannot reasonably rely upon "representations or acts if they are contrary to his knowledge 
of the truth or if he had the means by which with reasonable diligence he could ascertain 
the truth." 814 P.2d at 1130 (citations omitted). Reversing a denial of summary 
judgment, the Court went on to state, 
Mrs. Perkins had the means by which she could have 
ascertained the contents of Great-West's policy With 
reasonable diligence, Mrs. Perkins could have easily learned 
that she was not eligible for coverage under Great-West's 
insurance policy. Given Mrs. Perkins' failure to learn the 
terms of her insurance policy, her reliance thereon was not 
reasonable. 
Id. at 1130-31.19 
The Utah County Policy unambiguously states that Sherrie Ellison's dependent 
life insurance coverage ended when she no longer met the definition of dependent. (R. 
223, 292-93.) Ellison easily could have discovered this fact by obtaining a copy of the 
policy from Utah County and reviewing its terms. However, Ellison testified that he 
never requested a copy of the policy, even though he and his wife were discussing 
lv
 See also Govt Computer Sales, Inc. v. Dell Marketing, L.P., No. F04-0030 CV (RRB), 
2005 WL 1713182 *3 (Alaska 2005) ("Plaintiff could not reasonably have relied on 
representations so clearly inconsistent with its written contract and agreements."); Jim 
Walter Homes, Inc. v. Spraggins, 853 So.2d 913, 916 (Ala. 2002) ("[A] party cannot 
reasonably rely on such a statement when the written . . . agreement signed by them 
clearly contradicts any such alleged statement." (citations omitted)). 
4852-53U-7954 2 31 
divorce at least one year before the divorce occurred and even though she had a terminal 
illness during that entire time period. (R. 297-98, 403, 432.) Ellison's alleged reliance 
upon statements contrary to the terms of the Policy when he easily could have ascertained 
its terms was unreasonable as a matter of law. 
Ellison's alleged reliance upon Ms. Daly's statements is rendered further 
unreasonable by the fact that the most Ms. Daly would say was that she believed 
coverage could continue. The possibility of coverage continuing and the mechanics of 
how to do so are two different things. Her statements were clearly qualified and 
equivocal. A review of the transcript of the phone call makes clear that no reasonable 
person would leave that call believing anything definite, much less that coverage would 
be in force if the premiums were simply paid. Because he did not reasonably rely upon 
Ms. Daly's purported representations, Ellison's fraud claim failed as a matter of law. 
This is yet another ground upon which the Court can and should affirm summary 
judgment on the fraud claim. 
IV, THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON ELLISON'S ESTOPPEL CLAIM BECAUSE THE 
UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOWED THAT ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF 
THAT CLAIM FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Citing the same alleged misrepresentations that formthe basis of his failed fraud 
claim (i.e., that Sherrie Ellison's coverage could continue as long as he kept paying the 
premiums), Ellison next attempted to invoke equitable principles and allege that Hartford 
should be estopped from denying his claim for life insurance benefits. The district court 
correctly held that Ellison's estoppel claim failed as a matter of law because (1) estoppel 
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cannot be invoked to expand coverage to include risks that the policy does not explicitly 
cover; (2) the representations Hartford allegedly made were not sufficiently definite to 
sustain an estoppel claim; and (3) the Hartford representative to whom Ellison spoke did 
not have authority to bind the company. 
A. As a Matter of Law, Ellison Cannot Use an Estoppel Claim To Expand 
the Scope of Coverage Provided Under the Written Policy. 
The doctrine of estoppel is an equitable one. It permits a court "to modify a 
contract or prevent a party from denying the validity of a contract when one party has 
relied on another party's conduct." Swan Creek Village Homeowners v. Warne, 134 P.3d 
1122, 1129 (Utah 2006). However, in the important 1991 case of Perkins v. Great-West 
Life Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this Court explained and 
applied a crucial limitation on estoppel claims arising in the insurance context: "the 
doctrine of estoppel . . . cannot be used to bring risks which were not covered by the 
terms of the policy within coverage of the policyT Id. at 1131 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, as a matter of law, any representation by Ms. Daly that coverage on Ms. 
Other jurisdictions have similarly held the doctrine of estoppel cannot be used to 
expand coverage to include risks the policy does not explicitly cover. See McGowan v. 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 100 P.3d 521, 526 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) ("[T]he 
doctrines of waiver and of estoppel, based upon the conduct or action of the insurer, are 
not available to bring within the coverage of the policy risks not covered by its terms.5'); 
Topeka Tent & Awning v. Glen Falls Ins., 114 P.2d 984, 986 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) 
("Waiver and estoppel . . . cannot be used to expand [a policy's] coverage."); Boyer 
Metal Fab. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 750 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) 
("Estoppel cannot, however, be employed to create coverage when none existed under the 
policy."); Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz. V. Zumstein, 675 P.2d 729, 734-5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1983) (u[E]vidence in the form of oral representations made subsequent to the accident 
will not create a claim of estoppel against the insurer because that doctrine cannot 
provide coverage for risks the policy does not cover by its terms."). 
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Ellison could continue following the Ellisons' divorce cannot, under Perkins, broaden the 
21 
Policy to create coverage for a non-dependent. 
This Court reaffirmed the Perkins doctrine in 2005 in Youngblood v. Auto-Owners 
Ins. Co., 2005 UT App 154, 111 P.3d 829. In Youngblood, the Court held that, although 
the doctrine of estoppel could be applied to representations an insurer makes before a 
policy is purchased, the doctrine cannot be applied to post-purchase representations: 
We adopt the view that estoppel may not generally be used to 
extend the terms of an insurance contract. However, we 
hold that estoppel may bar an insurer's defense of 
noncoverage . . . when an insurance agent makes material 
misrepresentations to a prospective insured before or at the 
inception of the contract and the prospective insured 
reasonably relies upon such misrepresentations in purchasing 
the insurance. 
2005 UT App 154, ^f21 (emphasis added). In short, as this Court recognized in both 
Youngblood and Perkins, post-contract representations such as those Ellison alleges 
22 
cannot be used to extend the coverage of an insurance policy under an estoppel theory. 
The important policy considerations underlying this rule of law are obvious. If a 
plaintiff such as Ellison could survive summary judgment on a claim seeking to expand 
coverage under an existing insurance policy by providing nothing more than his own 
testimony concerning an alleged telephone conversation with an insurance company 
employee, it is difficult to imagine how any insurer could have any confidence at all in 
the scope of the coverage it has written. Its written policy documents could be rendered 
meaningless based solely the self-serving testimony of an insured. The consequences to 
the insurance industry would be catastrophic. 
Ellison argues that the Utah Supreme Court's decision affirming this Court in 
Youngblood somehow alters the pertinent legal principles. (Br. of Appellant at 28.) It 
does not. The Supreme Court chose to focus in its Youngblood decision on the 
distinctions between the doctrines of equitable estoppel and promissory estoppel rather 
than analyzing the distinction between claims based on pre-contract conduct and those 
based on post-contract conduct, as this Court did in its Youngblood opinion. Youngblood 
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Perkins clearly bars Ellison's estoppel claim. The misrepresentations Ellison 
alleges as the basis for estoppel occurred, without exception, long after Ellison elected 
dependent coverage for Sherrie Ellison under his employer plan. Indeed, Ellison himself 
makes this point forcefully in his brief 
The misrepresentations were about whether the Policy, at that 
specific moment in time, provided that coverage for 
dependents continued, even after divorce, so long as the 
premiums continued to be paid. In other words, the 
misrepresentations concerned the provisions and procedures 
of the Policy in their then-existing form. As such, the 
misrepresentations concerned material facts which were then 
in existence. 
(Br. of Appellant at 19 (emphasis added).) Thus, Ellison's own words show that this is a 
case about the interpretation of an "existing" policy in its "then-existing" form, and it 
thus falls within the scope of Perkins. It is not a case involving alleged precontractual 
representations, which would fall within the scope of Youngblood. As a matter of law, 
the post-election representations Ellison complains about, even if made, cannot form the 
v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, 158 P.3d 1088. Significantly, however, the 
Supreme Court affirmed this Court's Youngblood decision and did not criticize this 
Court's reasoning in any way or vacate any part of its opinion. Nothing about the 
Supreme Court's Youngblood opinion suggests that it disagreed with the Perkins holding 
that estoppel claims attempting to expand the scope of written insurance contracts based 
on post-contracting conduct fail as a matter of law. Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly 
limited its review of this Court's Youngblood opinion to the "sole question" of whether 
estoppel can apply "when the company's agent misstated the scope of coverage prior to 
the insured's purchase of the policy" 2007 UT 28, f^ 10 (emphasis added). Moreover, 
the Supreme Court cited Perkins with approval in its Youngblood opinion. 2007 UT 28, 
f^ 33 n.18. There is no question that Perkins is still good law following the Supreme 
Court's Youngblood opinion. 
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basis of an estoppel claim to bring non-covered risks within the Policy's coverage. For 
this reason alone, the district court was correct to grant summary judgment in favor of 
Hartford on Ellison's estoppel claim. 
B. The Evidence Submitted by Ellison is Vague, Indefinite, and Lacking 
in Foundation, and it is Thus Inadmissible To Establish a Prima Facie 
Estoppel Claim for Trial. 
Ellison's estoppel argument also fails because, as discussed above in part ILA., the 
statements made during Ellison's phone call to Hartford were not definite representations. 
A statement cannot form the basis of an estoppel claim unless it is sufficiently definite. 
See Rodowicz v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 192 F.3d 162, 177-78 (1st Cir. 1999) 
("As stated, many of the alleged representations upon which plaintiffs claim to have 
relied were mere statements of opinion or belief, not definite representations concerning 
past or present facts."); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 872 (stating that liability under 
Ellison attempts to distinguish Perkins by describing in cursory fashion a number of 
differences between the facts of this case and the Perkins facts. (Br. of Appellant at 26.) 
Yet he fails to explain why those distinguishing factors would have made any difference 
to the outcome of the Perkins case. The central legal doctrine established in Perkins 
applies in this case, notwithstanding any factual differences that may be present. The 
alleged distinctions Ellison lists are immaterial. For example, he argues Perkins is 
distinguishable because he is not attempting an expansion of coverage, but instead is 
attempting a "perpetuation" of coverage because his wife (before she was an ex-spouse) 
was, at one time, covered by the Policy. (Br. of Appellant at 26.) This is no distinction at 
all. Plainly, by arguing that his ex-wife, a non-dependent, is eligible for dependent life 
insurance coverage under the Policy, Ellison is attempting to "bring risks which were not 
covered by the terms of the policy within coverage of the policy." Other distinctions 
Ellison asserts simply are not supported by the record evidence. He argues Perkins is 
distinguishable because he, unlike the Perkins plaintiff, allegedly "made multiple 
attempts to obtain information about the Policy from the defendants." Id. (emphasis 
added). Even if this could be a pertinent distinction, the record below is clear that Ellison 
made no effort to obtain the policy from Defendants until after his ex-wife had died. (R. 
297-98, 403, 432.) 
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theory of equitable estoppel must be based upon a "definite misrepresentation."). Utah 
law implicitly recognizes this proposition by requiring that a plaintiffs reliance upon an 
alleged misrepresentation be "reasonable." Youngblood, 2005 UT App 154, ^ 21-24; 
see also Dahl Inv. Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, f 14, 101 P.3d 830. Alleged 
reliance on an indefinite statement is unreasonable as a matter of law. 
The statements Ms. Daly made during her conversation with Ellison were not 
sufficiently definite to sustain an estoppel claim. Ms. Daly qualified her statements to 
Ellison, saying that she "believed" Sherrie Ellison's life insurance coverage could 
continue after the Ellison's divorce but was not sure, and she directed Ellison to speak 
with someone in another department. (R. 101-02; Add. D.) She also told Ellison her 
department did not administer the life insurance plan and declined to put her belief into 
writing. Id. In short, no reasonable person could find that Ms. Daly was making a 
definite statement regarding the ability to continue Ms. Ellison's coverage. 
C. The Representative to Whom Ellison Spoke Did Not Have Authority 
To Bind Hartford. 
Finally, Ms. Daly's statements were insufficient to give rise to a claim of estoppel 
because she did not have authority to bind Hartford. Under Utah law, the representations 
of an employee are not binding upon a company unless those representations concern a 
matter made within the scope of the employee's agency. Wayment v. Clear Channel 
Broadcasting, Inc., 2005 UT 25, % 46, 116 P.3d 271. In this case Ms. Daly told Ellison 
the questions he raised with her were outside the scope of her employment and agency. 
She stated, "I'm trying to think who would be . . . we're in the medical underwriting area 
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what we do is we simply underwrite the application. We don't administer the plan. . . , 
Fm going to refer you to another number." (R. 101-02; Add. D.) Because Ms. Daly did 
not have authority to bind Hartford, and because Ellison was aware of that fact during 
their conversation, her statements are insufficient to bind Hartford and Ellison's reliance 
upon those statements was unreasonable as a matter of law. 
For all of these reasons, there was no genuine issue of material fact, and Ellison's 
estoppel claim failed as a matter of law. The Court should affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Hartford. 
V- THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON ELLISON'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM 
AGAINST HARTFORD, AND ELLISON HAS ESSENTIALLY 
ABANDONED THAT CLAIM ON APPEAL, 
Ellison alleged below that the dependent coverage provisions of the Policy 
constituted a contract between him and Hartford and that Hartford breached this 
contract when it denied his claim for life insurance benefits after the death of his ex-wife. 
(R. 6 at Tflj 44-49.) Ellison, however, did not identify a single provision of the Policy that 
he claims was breached. This is because the clear terms of the Policy provide that 
Sherrie Ellison's life insurance coverage ended when she was no longer Ellison's 
dependent. Ms. Daly's statements could not vary the terms of the Policy, nor did they 
Ellison provided no evidence whatsoever concerning identity, job description, or 
authority of the second Hartford employee he claims spoke to him during the phone call, 
so he failed to establish that she had authority to bind the corporation either. 
25
 In fact, it was a group policy between Utah County and its employees. (R. 373, 292-
93,220-55.) 
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purport to. The undisputed material facts show that Hartford did not breach the terms of 
the Policy because it applied those provisions correctly to Ellison's claims. 
To establish his breach of contract claim, Ellison was required to demonstrate, "(1) 
a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by 
the other party, and (4) damages." Pair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, % 14, 20 
P.3d 388. When interpreting an insurance policy, Utah courts look to the "four comers of 
the agreement" to determine the intent of the parties, and if that intent is clear and 
unambiguous, the court will give effect to it. See Perkins, 814 P.2d at 1129 (citing Ron 
Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989) and 
Draughon v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Soc'y, 111 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
In this case, the unambiguous language of the Policy supports Hartford's denial of 
Ellison's claim for life insurance benefits. Ellison's ex-wife was insured under the 
Policy's "Dependent Coverage" provisions. (R. 373, 292-93, 220-33.) The Policy 
defines Dependent as "(1) Your spouse and (2) Your unmarried child." (R. 494, 599.) 
The Policy's "Dependent Coverage" section states that dependent coverage terminates on 
the date that "the Dependent no longer meets the definition of Dependent." (R. 546, 223, 
It is unclear how seriously Ellison contends on appeal that summary judgment was 
improper on his breach of contract claim against Hartford. In the pertinent section of his 
brief, Ellison complains primarily about co-defendant Utah County. The only part of his 
analysis of his breach of contract claim that could possibly apply to Hartford consists of 
the short assertion that "[t]here is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the 
defendants are in breach of contract by making misrepresentations to Mr. Ellison and 
providing him with erroneous instructions regarding the Policy, as explained earlier." 
(Br. of Appellant at 33.) Although Ellison largely appears to have abandoned his breach 
of contract claim against Hartford, Hartford will explain why summary judgment on that 
claim was proper. 
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292-93.) These provisions of the Policy are unambiguous. When the Ellisons divorced, 
Sherrie Ellison was no longer Ellison's "spouse," and for this reason she no longer met 
the Policy's definition of "Dependent." Hence, her dependent life insurance coverage 
terminated on the date that her divorce became final, and Hartford correctly denied 
Ellison's claim for life insurance benefits. For this reason, Ellison's breach of contract 
claim fails as a matter of law, and the district court was correct to grant summary 
judgment. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON ELLISON'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED 
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING BECAUSE 
HARTFORD'S DENIAL OF ELLISON'S CLAIM WAS, AT VERY LEAST, 
"FAIRLY DEBATABLE/' 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an insurer cannot be liable for breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing for denying a claim that is "fairly debatable." 
Prince 2002 UT 68, \ 28 (citing Morris v. Health Net of Calif, Inc., 988 P.2d 940 (Utah 
1999); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1996); Callioux v. 
Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Ellison's lack of 
entitlement to life insurance proceeds is more than fairly debatable; it clearly is barred by 
the Policy's unambiguous language because after divorcing Ellison, Sherrie Ellison was 
no longer a "dependent" and hence not eligible for dependent life insurance coverage. 
Ellison's breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim fails as a matter of 
law, and summary judgment was proper. 
It is also undisputed that Hartford investigated and adjudicated Ellison's claim for 
life insurance benefits in good faith. For example, when Ellison appealed Hartford's 
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initial denial of his claim, Hartford assigned employee Edna Golych to the appeal, and 
she thoroughly investigated these claims. (R. 77-83, 402, 432.) After conducting a 
thorough investigation and analyzing the terms of the policy, which clearly provided that 
dependent care coverage terminated when Sherrie Ellison divorced Ellison, Ms. Golych 
concluded that Ellison's claim had been properly denied. (R. 8-9 at ^}26, 401, 432.) 
Hartford's thorough investigation of Ellison's claims, which was undisputed below, 
demonstrates that it dealt with him in good faith at all times. More significantly, Hartford 
cannot be accused of bad faith because it correctly applied the unambiguous terms of the 
Policy. For these reasons, summary judgment on Ellison's breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing claims was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court was correct to grant summary judgment dismissing Ellison's 
claims against Hartford, and this Court should affirm that decision in all respects. 
DATED this 31st day of October, 2 0 0 8 . ^ — ^ ^ - ^ J^~~~-
^ ^ ^ R & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Hartford Life and Accident 
Insurance Company 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VAL M. ELLISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH COUNTY GOVERNMENT and 
HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Connecticut 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF DEFENDANTS 
Case No. 050402012 
Judge: Hon. James R. Taylor 
Division #7 
INTRODUCTION 
1. On July 20, 2007, the Court heard oral argument on Defendant Hartford Life and 
Accident Insurance Company's ("Hartford") Motion for Summary Judgment and on Defendant 
Utah County Government's ("Utah County") Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Val M. 
Ellison was represented by Kenneth Parkinson of Howard Lewis & Petersen. Defendant 
Hartford was represented by Erik A. Christiansen of Parsons Behle & Latimer. Defendant Utah 
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County was represented by Kristin A. VanOrman of Strong and Hanni. After careful review of 
the briefs, all admissible evidence and oral argument, the Court hereby rules and orders as 
follows: 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
2. Mr. Ellison's claims center around his contention that he is entitled to life 
insurance proceeds under an employee life insurance plan offered by Utah County ("the Plan"), 
his employer. The undisputed facts are that the Plan was offered by Utah County to its eligible 
employees and was funded by a group life insurance policy issued by Hartford to Utah County. 
The Plan permitted eligible Utah County employees to elect dependent life insurance coverage 
for their dependents. The Policy defines "Dependent" as "Your spouse" and "Your unmarried 
child." The Policy also states that dependent coverage terminates on the date when, "the 
Dependent no longer meets the definition of Dependent." A dependent whose coverage ends 
because he/she ceases to meet the definition of "Dependent" has the option under the Policy to 
convert his/her dependent coverage into a conversion policy. The Policy explains, 
How does an individual convert coverage? 
To convert life insurance, the individual must, within 31 days of 
the date group coverage terminates, make written application to Us 
and pay the premium for his age and class of risk. 
3. It is undisputed that in about 1998, Mr. Ellison elected dependent life insurance 
coverage for Sherrie Ellison, his wife at that time. In 2001, Sherrie Ellison was diagnosed with 
pancreatic cancer, a condition that was terminal. During the period of her illness, Sherrie Ellison 
initiated divorce proceedings against Mr. Ellison. On August 21, 2003, the divorce was 
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finalized. Sherrie Ellison died on October 19, 2003. She never converted her group dependent 
life insurance coverage into an individual policy. 
4. It also is undisputed that after Sherrie Ellison's death, Mr. Ellison made a claim 
for life insurance proceeds to Hartford. Hartford denied the claim on the grounds that Sherrie 
Ellison ceased to be eligible for dependent life insurance coverage after her divorce from Mr. 
Ellison, because she no longer met the definition of "Dependent." 
5. Mr. Ellison claims, however, that prior to his and Sherrie Ellison's divorce, he 
had a conversation with someone at Utah County and that he believed that he spoke with two 
Hartford representatives wherein he was told that life insurance coverage for Sherrie Ellison 
could continue subsequent to their divorce. Mr. Ellison specifically identified in his 
interrogatory responses a call on January 30, 2003, and testified during his deposition that he was 
transferred to a second Hartford representative during that call. Mr. Ellison does not know the 
identity of the alleged other employee with whom he claims he spoke. Hartford has produced in 
discovery a recording of a single telephone conversation Mr. Ellison had with one of its 
representatives, Linda Daly. 
6. Both plaintiffs and defendant's phone records revealed only one telephone call 
from plaintiff to Hartford. During that recorded phone call, Ellison spoke with Ms. Daly of 
Hartford's Medical Underwriting area. In that phone call with Ms. Daly, Ellison stated that Utah 
County informed him that he could continue insurance on his spouse, even if he and his wife 
divorced. He asked Ms. Daly if this was accurate. Ms. Daly responded, 
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I believe so yes. . . . I don ' t . . . I haven't heard anything as to why, 
I think that's your option if you want to . . . They're going to be 
payroll deducting for her so if you want to keep her on there, that's 
fine. 
7. Ellison next told Ms. Daly that he needed a letter for the court. Ms. Daly asked if 
he had filled out a personal health statement, and he said that he had. Ms. Daly then responded: 
I'm trying to think who would be . . . we're in the medical 
underwriting area and what we do is we simply underwrite the 
application, we really, we don't administer the plan. . . . Did your 
benefits or HR department tell you to call us? 
8. Ellison responded his HR department had told him to call Hartford and said again 
that he needed something in writing. At that point, Ms. Daly responded: 
You know what, I'm going to transfer you to another number that 
may be able to help you and hopefully they can, if they cannot, 
you know, feel free to call me back and we'll research it further to 
see who can help you. 
At this point, Mr. Ellison asked for Ms. Daly's name to write down. She spelled her name for 
him and gave him another number to call. 
9. According to the transcript, the call then terminated. There is no evidence on the 
transcript that Mr. Ellison was transferred to another person or number. The transcript also 
reveals that Mr. Ellison did not ask Ms. Daly what he needed to do, e.g. complete paperwork or 
otherwise, in order to effect the continuation of coverage on his ex-wife. 
10. Neither Hartford, Utah County, nor Ellison has any documentary record or 
recording of any second phone call to Hartford. 
11. At no time, as admitted by Mr. Ellison, did Mr. Ellison ask for or obtain a copy of 
the Policy. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
12. Summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Utah. R. Civ. Pro. 56(b). All inferences that reasonably can be drawn from the facts should be 
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Ho v. Jim's Enter., Inc., 29 P.3d 633, 634 (Utah 
2001); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The party opposing summary 
judgment has the duty to "set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." DLB 
Collection Trust by Helgesen & Waterfall v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting 
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e)). u[B]are contentions unsupported by any specification of facts in support 
thereof, raise no material questions of fact as will preclude entry of summary judgment." Massey 
v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980). Moreover, a party opposing summary 
judgment must do so with admissible evidence. Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., Inc., 101 
P.3d 371, 377 (Utah App. 2004). 
13. As set forth in the pleadings and the undisputed admissible evidence before the 
Court, the Court holds that Mr. Ellison's claim for breach of contract against Hartford and Utah 
County fails as a matter of law because Sherrie Ellison was not covered by the Policy's 
unambiguous dependent coverage provisions once she divorced Mr. Ellison and no longer met 
the Policy's definition of "Dependent." See Perkins v Great-West Life Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 
1125, 1129 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v Blomquist, 
113 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989) and Draughon v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Socy, 111 P.2d 1105, 
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1108 (Utah Ct App. 1989)) (stating that when interpreting an insurance policy, Utah courts look 
to the "four corners of the agreement" to determine the intent of the parties, and if that intent is 
clear and unambiguous, the court will give effect to it). 
14. As set forth in the pleadings and undisputed admissible evidence before the Court, 
the Court also holds that Ellison's breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim 
against Hartford fails as a matter of law because, in the insurance context, such a claim cannot be 
maintained if the insurer denied a claim that was "fairly debatable." Prince v. Bear River Mut. 
Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 533 (Utah 2002) (citing Morris v. Health Net of Calif, Inc., 988 P.2d 940 
(Utah 1999); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1996); Callioux v. 
Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). The Policy states that dependent 
life insurance coverage ends on the date a dependent ceases to meet the Policy's definition of 
"Dependent." Sherrie Ellison ceased to meet the Policy's definition of "Dependent" when her 
divorce from Mr. Ellison became final. For this reason, the Court concludes that Hartford's 
denial of Mr. Ellison's claim on these grounds is "fairly debatable." 
15. Based on the pleadings before the Court and the undisputed admissible facts 
before the Court, the Court concludes that Mr. Ellison's fraud claim against Utah County and 
Hartford fails as a matter of law for multiple and independent reasons as set forth herein: 
16. A party asserting a fraud claim bears the burden of proving each of the elements 
of that claim by clear and convincing evidence. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 
536 (Utah 2002) (quoting Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198 
(2001)). 
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17. Mr. Ellison's fraud claim fails because there is no admissible evidence that he 
reasonably relied upon the statements of Ms. Daly. The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that 
any reasonable person, after speaking to Ms. Daly, would have investigated further, obtained 
further paperwork, including a copy of the policy, and/or come back to Ms. Daly for more 
information. A reasonable person would not have done nothing, as Mr. Ellison admitted he did 
in this case. 
18. Based on the undisputed facts and admissible evidence before the Court, the 
Court further concludes that there is no admissible evidence to support Mr. Ellison's assertion of 
a conversation with an unknown and unidentifiable Utah County employee regarding the 
continuation of life insurance benefits for Sherrie Ellison. Similarly, there is no admissible 
evidence to support Mr. Ellison's assertion of a separate conversation with an unknown and 
unidentifiable employee at Hartford. 
19. The Court finds that, in the absence of any admissible evidence, Mr. Ellison's 
representations regarding his alleged communications with Hartford and Utah County are 
unreliable, inadmissible, and cannot be taken as a sufficient evidentiary and factual basis to 
establish the fact of or the content of those alleged conversations with unknown and 
unidentifiable persons. 
20. Further, the only conversation that is documented, Mr. Ellison's January 30, 2002 
conversation with Linda Daly of Hartford, is insufficient to establish reasonable reliance and 
extend the express terms of the life insurance policy. 
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21. The Court also concludes separately and independently that there was no 
reasonable reliance by Mr. Ellison as a matter of law because Perkins v. Great-West Life 
Assurance Co,, 814 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) controls the analysis of this issue. In 
Perkins, the Utah Court of Appeals held that an insured's reliance upon the post-contract 
representations of the insurers agent is not reasonable when those representations contradict the 
plain terms of the insurance policy and the insured has access to that policy. Id, at 1130; see also 
Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Capital Management, LLC, 223 F. Supp.2d 474, 485 
(S.D.N. Y. 2002) (stating that reliance is unreasonable "as a matter of law" "where the statements 
relied upon are explicitly contradicted by a written agreement between the parties involved."); 
Govt. Computer Sales, Inc. v. Dell Marketing, L.P., No. F04-0030 CV (RRB), 2005 WL 
1713182 *3 (Alaska 2005) ("Plaintiff could not reasonably have relied on representations so 
clearly inconsistent with its written contract and agreements."); Jim Walter Homes, Inc v. 
Spraggins, 853 So.2d 913, 916 (Ala. 2002) ("[A] party cannot reasonably rely on such a 
statement when the written . . . agreement signed by them clearly contradicts any such alleged 
statement." (citations omitted)). Because Mr. Ellison, with reasonable diligence, could have 
obtained a copy of his policy and discovered the requirements of the conversion provisions, his 
reliance on post-contract representations, if any, was unreasonable as a matter of law. 
22. The Court also finds that no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the 
transcript of the recording of the Daly call manifests an intent by Ms. Daly to deceive or 
misrepresent a fact. Thus, Mr. Ellison's fraud claim fails for this separate and independent 
reason as well. 
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23. The Court also finds that there was no misrepresentation regarding in existing 
material fact in this case, and that Mr. Ellison's fraud claim also fails for this separate and 
independent reason. "[A) misrepresentation of intended future pcrfonnaneo -i^^not—a-
representation concerning a 'presently existing fact' upon which a claim for fraud can be based 
unless [the-plaintiff] can prove that [the defendant], at the time of the representation, did not 
intond to perform tho promise and made the representation for the purpose of deceiving [the 
plaintiff]." Republic Group, Inc. v. Won Door<€wp., 883 P.2d 285, 292-ffJtah Ct. App. 1994) 
(citing Ccrritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No, 1, 645 P,2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982), The 
representations alleged by Mr. Ellison in-this case were,all representations of future pprfonrmnre-
and, for this reason, cannot support Mr. Ellison's fraud daim. 
24. The Court finds that Mr. Ellison's fraud claim fails separately and independently 
as a matter of law because there is no admissible evidence of damages. Specifically, there is no 
connection between Mr. Ellison's alleged loss and his claimed damages in this case. There is no 
admissible evidence from which the fact-finder can reasonably infer that Sherrie Ellison would 
have converted her group insurance policy into an individual policy, and there is no evidence that 
Mr. Ellison, rather than Sherrie Ellison's estate or heirs, would have been the beneficiaries of 
that conversion policy. 
25. Mr. Ellison's estoppel claim against Hartford fails for many of the same reasons 
that his fraud claim fails as set forth herein: 
26. First, to establish a claim of estoppel, a plaintiff must demonstrate reasonable 
reliance. As discussed above, Mr. Ellison's reliance was not reasonable as a matter of 
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undisputed fact or law. See Perkins, 814 P.2d 1125; Internet Law Library, 223 F. Supp. 2d 474; 
Govt. Computer Sales, No. F04-0030 CV (RRB), 2005 WL 1713182; Jim Walter Homes, 853 
So. 2d 913. 
27. Second, for the reasons set forth above, there is no admissible evidence of any 
misrepresentation by an employee of Hartford. Similarly, there is no admissible evidence of any 
misrepresentation by an employee of Hartford who had legal authority to bind Hartford. The 
representations of an employee are not binding upon a company unless those representations 
concern a matter made within the scope of the employee's agency. See Wayment v. Clear 
Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 116 P.3d 271, 287 (Utah 2005). Based on the undisputed 
admissible facts before the Court, that is not the case here. 
28. Finally, and most of all, for the reasons set forth above, there is no admissible 
evidence of damages to give rise to a claim of estoppel. 
29. Mr. Ellison's negligence claim against Utah County fails as a matter of law 
because, as discussed above, there is no admissible evidence of any conversation between Mr. 
Ellison and Utah County wherein the County negligently represented to Mr. Ellison that life 
insurance coverage for Sherrie Ellison would continue after their divorce. 
30. Mr. Ellison's negligence claim also fails because it is premised primarily upon 
Utah County's alleged failure to inform him of the Policy provisions and procedures, particularly 
the Policy's conversion procedures. However, Mr. Ellison could have, with reasonable 
diligence, obtained a copy of the Policy and informed himself regarding the Policy's provisions 
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and procedures. Mr. Ellison, however, admits that he took no steps to obtain a copy of the Policy 
during the relevant time period. 
GRANTING OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
31. For all of the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Mr. Ellison has 
failed to present any genuine factual disputes sufficient to forestall summary judgment in favor 
of Defendants under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court therefore finds 
that all of Plaintiffs claims fail as a matter of law, and are hereby dismigggd, with prejudice. 
32. The Court hereby grants summary judgment in ^ ^ y ^ M ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f t d Utah County 
on all of Plaintiff's claims, all of which are hereby dismissed,! 
DATED this g£ day of S * - ~ . 2 0 0 ^ 
Approved as to form: 
Kenneth Parkinson 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
Kristin A. Van Orman 
Counsel for Utah County Government 
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Cwest *s Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 31A. Insurance Code 
*ii Chapter 21. Insurance Contracts in General 
"fri Part 1. General Rules 
•"•§ 31A-21-104. Insurable interest and consent--Scope 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) For purposes of this section, "exchange" means an exchange made pursuant to 
Section 1035, Internal Revenue Code, as may be amended. 
(b) "Insurable interest" in a person means the following, including a circumstance 
described in Subsection (3): 
(i) for a person closely related by blood or by law, a substantial interest 
engendered by love and affection; or 
(ii) in the case of a person not described in Subsection (1)(b)(i), a lawful and 
substantial interest in having the life, health, and bodily safety of the person 
insured continue. 
(c) "Insurable interest" in property or liability means any lawful and substantial 
economic interest in the nonoccurrence of the event insured against. 
(d) "Viatical settlement" is as defined in Section 31A-36-102. 
(2)(a) An insurer may not knowingly provide insurance to a person who does not have 
or expect to have an insurable interest in the subject of the insurance. 
(b) A person may not knowingly procure, directly, by assignment, or otherwise, an 
interest in the proceeds of an insurance policy unless that person has or expects 
to have an insurable interest in the subject of the insurance. 
(c) In the case of life insurance, the insurable interest requirements of 
Subsections (2)(a) and (b): 
(i) are satisfied if the requirements are met: 
(A) at the effective date of the insurance policy; and 
(B) at the time of a later procurement, if any, of an interest in the proceeds 
of an insurance policy; and 
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(ii) do not need to be met at the time that proceeds of an insurance policy are 
payable if the requirements are met at the times specified in Subsection 
(2) (c) (i) . 
(d) Except as provided in Subsections (7) and (8), insurance provided in violation 
of this Subsection (2) is subject to Subsection (6). 
(e) A policy holder in a group insurance policy does not need an insurable 
interest if a certificate holder or a person other than the group policyholder who 
is specified by the certificate holder is the recipient of the proceeds of the 
group insurance policy. 
(3) The following is a nonexhaustive list of insurable interests: 
(a) Each person has an unlimited insurable interest in that person's own life and 
health. 
(b) A shareholder, member, or partner has an insurable interest in the life of 
another shareholder, member, or partner for purposes of an insurance contract that 
is an integral part of a legitimate buy-sell agreement respecting shares, 
membership interests, or partnership interests in the business. 
(c) A trust has an insurable interest in the subject of the insurance to the 
extent that a beneficiary of the trust has the insurable interest. 
(d)(i) Subject to Subsection (3)(d)(v), an employer or an employer sponsored 
trust: 
(A) has an insurable interest in the lives of the employer's: 
(I) directors; 
(II) officers; 
(III) managers; 
(IV) nonmanagement employees; and 
(V) retired employees; and 
(B) may insure a life listed in Subsection (3)(d)(i)(A): 
(I) on an individual or group basis; and 
(II) with the written consent of the insured. 
(ii)(A) A trustee of a trust established by an employer for the sole benefit of 
the employer has the same insurable interest in the life and health of any 
person as does the employer. 
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(B) Without limiting the general principle in Subsection (3)(d)(ii)(A), a 
trustee of a trust established by an employer that provides life, health, 
disability, retirement, or similar benefits to an individual identified in 
Subsection (3)(d)(i)(A) has an insurable interest in the life of the individual 
described in Subsection (3)(d)(i)(A) for whom the benefits are provided. 
(iii)(A) For the purpose of exchanging life insurance, an individual described 
in Subsection (3)(d)(i)(A) includes an individual who was formerly included 
under Subsection (3)(d)<i)(A) if the life insurance to be exchanged: 
(I) is purchased or acquired while the individual is a current director, 
officer, manager, or employee; and 
(II) is exchanged for life insurance in an amount that does not exceed the 
amount of the insurance being exchanged. 
(B) Written consent of an individual described in this Subsection (3)(d)(iii) 
is not required at the time of the exchange of the life insurance. 
(C) This Subsection (3)(d)(iii) shall be interpreted in a manner consistent 
with Subsection (2)(c). 
(iv)(A) If an employer or trustee establishes an insurable interest as provided 
in this Subsection (3)(d) and all of the employer's business is acquired, 
purchased, merged into, or otherwise transferred to a subsequent employer, the 
insurable interest of the original employer or trustee in an individual 
described in Subsection (3)(d)(i)(A) is automatically transferred to: 
(I) the subsequent employer; or 
(II) the trustee of a trust established by the subsequent employer for the 
subsequent employer's sole benefit. 
(B) A subsequent employer or a trustee of a trust described in Subsection 
(3)(d)(iv)(A)(II) may exchange life insurance that is purchased or acquired in 
an individual described in Subsection (3)(d)(i)(A) by the original employer or 
trustee without establishing a new insurable interest at the time of the 
exchange of the insurance. 
(v) The extent of an employer's or employer sponsored trust's insurable interest 
for a nonmanagement or retired employee under Subsection (3)(d)(i) is limited to 
an amount commensurate with the employer's unfunded liabilities at the time 
insurance on the nonmanagement or retired employee is procured. 
(4)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (5), an insurer may not knowingly issue an 
individual life or accident and health insurance policy to a person other than the 
one whose life or health is at risk unless that person: 
(i) is 18 years of age or older; 
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(ii) is not under guardianship under Title 75, Chapter 5, Protection of Persons 
Under Disability and Their Property; and 
(iii) gives written consent to the issuance of the policy. 
(b) A person shall express consent: 
(i) by signing an application for the insurance with knowledge of the nature of 
the document; or 
(ii) in any other reasonable way. 
(c) Insurance provided in violation of this Subsection (4) is subject to 
Subsection (6) . 
(5) (a) A life or accident and health insurance policy may be taken out without 
consent in a circumstance described in this Subsection (5)(a). 
(i) A person may obtain insurance on a dependent who does not have legal 
capacity. 
(ii) A creditor may,-at the creditor's expense, obtain insurance on the debtor 
in an amount reasonably related to the amount of the debt. 
(iii) A person may obtain life and accident and health insurance on an immediate 
family member who is living with or dependent on the person. 
(iv) A person may obtain an accident and health insurance policy on others that 
would merely indemnify the policyholder against expenses the person would be 
legally or morally obligated to pay. 
(v) The commissioner may adopt rules permitting issuance of insurance for a 
limited term on the life or health of a person serving outside the continental 
United States who is in the public service of the United States, if the 
policyholder is related within the second degree by blood or by marriage to the 
person whose life or health is insured. 
(b) Consent may be given by another in a circumstance described in this Subsection 
(5) (b) . 
(i) A parent, a person having legal custody of a minor, or a guardian of a 
person under Title 75, Chapter 5, Protection of Persons Under Disability and 
Their Property, may consent to the issuance of a policy on a dependent child or 
on a person under guardianship under Title 75, Chapter 5, Protection of Persons 
Under Disability and Their Property. 
(ii) A grandparent may consent to the issuance of life or accident and health 
insurance on a grandchild. 
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(iii) A court of general jurisdiction may give consent to the issuance of a life 
or accident and health insurance policy on an ex parte application showing facts 
the court considers sufficient to justify the issuance of that insurance. 
(6)(a) An insurance policy is not invalid because: 
(i) the insurance policy is issued or procured in violation of Subsection (2); 
or 
(ii) consent has not been given. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), a court with appropriate jurisdiction may: 
(i) order the proceeds to be paid to some person who is equitably entitled to 
the proceeds, other than the one to whom the policy is designated to be payable; 
or 
(ii) create a constructive trust in the proceeds or a part of the proceeds on 
behalf of a person who is equitably entitled to the proceeds, subject to all the 
valid terms and conditions of the policy other than those relating to insurable 
interest or consent. 
(7) This section does not prevent an organization described under Section 
501(c)(3), (e), or (f), Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and the regulations made 
under this section, and which is regulated under Title 13, Chapter 22, Charitable 
Solicitations Act, from soliciting and procuring, by assignment or designation as 
beneficiary, a gift or assignment of an interest in life insurance on the life of 
the donor or assignor or from enforcing payment of proceeds from that interest. 
(8) An insurance policy transferred pursuant to Chapter 36, Viatical Settlements 
Act, is not subject to Subsection (6)(b) and nothing else in this section shall 
prevent: 
(a) a policyholder of life insurance, whether or not the policyholder is also the 
subject of the insurance, from entering into a viatical settlement; 
(b) a person from soliciting a person to enter into a viatical settlement; 
(c) a person from enforcing payment of proceeds from the interest obtained under a 
viatical settlement; or 
(d) a viatical settlement provider, a viatical settlement purchaser, a financing 
entity, a related provider trust, or a special purpose entity from executing any 
of the following with respect to the death benefit or ownership of any portion of 
a viaticated policy as provided for in Section 31A-36-109: 
(i) an assignment; 
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(ii) a sale; 
(iii) a transfer; 
(iv) a devise; or 
(v) a bequest. 
(9) (a) The insurable interests described in this section: 
(i) are not exclusive; 
(ii) are cumulative of an insurable interest that is not expressly included in 
this section but exists in common law; and 
(iii) are not in lieu of an insurable interest that is not expressly included in 
this section but exists in common law. 
(b) The inclusion of an insurable interest in this section may not be considered 
to be excluding another insurable interest that is similar to the insurable 
interest included in this section. 
(c)(i) The recognition of an insurable interest in this section by Chapter 89, 
Laws of Utah 2007, does not imply or create a presumption that the insurable 
interest did not exist before April 30, 2 007. 
(ii) An insurable interest shall be presumed with respect to a life insurance 
policy issued before April 30, 2007 to a person whose insurable interest is 
recognized in this section by Chapter 89, Laws of Utah 2007. 
Laws 1985, c. 242, § 26; Laws 1986, c. 204, § 137; Laws 1991, c. 21, § 1; Laws 
1993, c. 305, § 27; Laws 1994, c. 60, § 1; Laws 1996, c. 190, § 1, eff. April 29, 
1996; Laws 2001, c. 116, § 54, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 308, § 30, eff. 
May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 81, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2007, c. 89, § 1, eff. 
April 30, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 307, § 4, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 263, § 
1, eff. May 5, 2008. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2007, c. 89, § 1, provides: 
"It is the intent of the Legislature that in preparing the Utah Code database for 
publication, the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel shall replace 
the references in Subsection 31A—21—104 (10) (c) from ^his bill1 to the bill's 
designated chapter number in the Laws of Utah." 
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of 
Laws 2007, c. 89, § 1 and Laws 2007, c. 307, § 4. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 31A-21-104, UT ST § 31A-21-104 
Current through 2008 General Session. 
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VAL M. ELLISON * MAY 1 2006 
that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q Switching gears to a different party. Yoi i 
know I represent II-JI ttoi J _ . : .. insurance; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How man, f i m o s on t h e t e l e p h ^ n * <t - -1 , 
s p e a k w i t h someone d i n d r i i o ? « nee 
f o r S h e r i i / i 11 i P a y n e - F l l i s o n 
A. I spoke „v .„w u , , f e r e n t p e o p l e on tlle 
Q. So oi] f ; M M , b h ' i M e r e i : L p e o p l e , or 
two c a l l s ? 
A . One e n ! 1 4~*,~ - i 4 * f - r o n * p e o p l e . 
Q. So di • -^  iM.iian) * *o bomebu 
ansfe ' vnii to somebody els**? 
A, Correct. 
Q. Those 
Kv telephone with n<tr i t(: correct " 
A. Those a i e " • v u m y o i \ e s I i <»< , ill. 
Q. Do yo i i r e c d l i w h a t y e a r ? 
A. L e t ' s see , ,i . i i i il I M I I I <M f Un u[ i I 
mi inI in i I 11 g — 11 i h i in mi i ii j I 
>egi nn u i { ; ' (),' 
Q. Let b urea 
telephone cal1 -^~ i" •. y u speak with? 
CitiCourt, LLC 
(801) 532-3441 337 
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A. I don't know. I didn't record the names. 
Q. Do you have any notes from that call? 
A. I don't. 
Q. How long did the call last? 
A. It was a short --
Q. First call? 
A. It's only one call. But --
Q. First person. 
A. First person, it was probably pretty 
short. I asked her the question about can you 
continue life insurance, and she indicated that she 
thought that I could as long as I pay the premiums. 
But then she said she wanted to transfer me to 
someone else just to make sure. 
Q. One minute, two minutes, three minutes, 
how long? 
A. The first person was probably, maybe, I 
don't know, probably less than 30 seconds, I would 
guess . 
Q. You had the sense from this first person 
that she thought you could maintain insurance, but 
wasn't sure, so she transferred you to somebody else 
to make sure? 
A. No, she actually seemed pretty sure, but I 
think she wanted to confirm it with somebody else. 
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Q. She transferred you to another person; is 
that correct? 
A. To another woman, 
Q. Do you know the name of the second person 
you spoke with? 
A. I don't. I didn't write it down. 
Q. Do you have any notes of that 
conversation? 
A. I don't. 
Q. What happened in this second conversation? 
A. She confirmed what the first person said. 
Q. What's your best recollection of what this 
person said to you? 
A. That you can continue the life insurance 
on my spouse if I divorce her, as long as you keep 
paying the premiums. 
Q. Did you ask about whether there was any 
paperwork you had to fill out? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Anything else about that second discussion 
with the second Hartford person you recall? 
A. No. 
Q. After you got off this one phone call with 
the two Hartford representatives, did you contact the 
county? 
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TRANSCRIPTION O F ELLISON PHONE CALL 
Daly: Medical I Jiiderwriting, this is Linda, how can I help you? 
Ellison: Hi Linda, Val Ellison calling, from uh Utah. 
Daly: Okay. 
Ellison: Where are you guys at? 
Daley: Connecticut. 
Ellison: Connecticut? Okay, I guess so, Hartford, right? 
Daly. Yeah. 
Ellison: I Ji n, 1 guess, uh, I work for I Jtah County Govern/! nei it. 
Daly: Okay. 
Ellison: And so you guys apparently have taken over for our life insurance, for this year. 
And My wife and I are getting a divorce, but personnel told me that you can 
continue insurance on your spouse even if you get divorced, is this accurate? 
• • ny: I believe so yes. I don' t . . . I haven't heard anything as to why. 1 think that's your 
option if you want to and you continue to ... they're going to be payroll deducting 
for her so if you want to keep her on there, that's fine. 
Ellison: Now, uh, what 1 will need then is just a letter stating so for the court, saying that it 
is possible and then I will tell them that I will continue it. 
Daly: What did ... Have you filled out a personal health statement yet, or no? 
Ellison: Well, yeah, from way back, ya know. I've been with the County for a long time so 
it's just been coming out of my payroll forever but it changes life insurance 
company from year to year ... or maybe every couple years ... so yeah, we did, a 
long time ago. 
Daly: I'm trying to think who would be ... we're in the medical underwriting area and 
what we do is we simply underwrite the application - we really, we don't 
administer the plan. 
Ellison: Okay. 
Daly: So, du benefits or you HR department tell you to call us? 
918351.1 102 
Ellison: They did. They gave me your phone number, they said, yes it is true that it can 
continue, but I said I needed something in writing, and they said, well, call the 
insurance company. 
Daly: You know what, I'm going to transfer you to another number that may be able to 
help you, um, and hopefully they can. If they cannot, you know, feel free to call 
me back and we'll research it further to see who can help you ... 
Ellison: Okay, let me write down your name again ... 
Daly^ Okay. 
Ellison: What was it... 
Daly: Linda and my last name is Daly, D-A-L-Y. The number I'm going to give you, 
I'm not sure if anybody's going to be there because it's 6:00 here and you came in 
right before the phones get shut off 
Ellison: Gotcha, okay. 
Daley So the number is 1-800-523-2233 and they're more on the administrative side of 
it, the billing side, so they may be able to help you. If they can't, you can call me 
back and my number is 1-800-331-7234 and I'll give you my extension, which is 
39642, and I'll try to research it here and see what I can find out if they're unable 
to help you. And again, the same thing stands for here, though our phone gets 
shut off at 6:00, so I don't know if you'll be able to get back in. 
Ellison: Good. 
Daly: Okay. 
Ellison Thank you Linda. 
Daly: You're welcome. 
Ellison: Bye. 
Daly: Bye, bye. 
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